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STATUTORY  PROXIMATE  CAUSE
Sandra F. Sperino*
INTRODUCTION
Federal statutes often use general causal language to describe
how an actor’s conduct must be connected to harm for liability to
attach.  For example, a statute might state that harm must be
“because” of certain conduct.1  Federal courts have recently relied on
this general causal language and other arguments to apply the com-
mon law idea of proximate cause to several federal statutes.2
While legal scholarship has explored the relationship between
statutes and the common law generally,3 it has not considered
whether particular common law doctrines are especially problematic
in the statutory context.  This Article argues that using proximate
cause in statutes raises many theoretical, doctrinal, and practical
 2013 Sandra F. Sperino.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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Glashausser, Joan Howarth, Emily Houh, Brad Mank, Darrell Miller, Noga Morag-
Levine, Douglas Mossman, Lumen Mulligan, Michael Solimine, Paul Stancil, Jane
Stapleton, Howard Wasserman, Verna Williams, and Verity Winship for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article.  I owe special thanks to Jane Baron for her
continued mentoring and insightful feedback on this project.  This Article has also
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1 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) & (b) (2006) (using words “because” and “on the
basis of”).
2 See infra note 79. R
3 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5 (1982);
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 45, 67 (1999); Roscoe Pound, Common Law
and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908) (examining the relationship between
legislation and judge-made law).
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problems, and that, to date, courts have engaged in crude statutory
interpretation that largely ignores these issues.
Court interpretation relies on demonstrably weak textual, intent,
and purpose-based arguments to justify using proximate cause.
Courts have not been sufficiently attentive to congressional direction,
separation of powers, the relationship of modern statutes to the com-
mon law, and whether proximate cause is theoretically stable.  I coin
the term “statutory proximate cause” to highlight the special issues
that arise when this common law principle is used in statutes.4
In statutory proximate cause cases courts assume that federal stat-
utes are comparable to common law torts, such as negligence.  While
statutes are often torts in the broad sense that they are civil actions
that do not arise from a contract, this definition is not helpful to
understanding whether proximate cause should be applied to a partic-
ular statute.
The Article highlights how, at its core, proximate cause is a mech-
anism for limiting liability for conduct that statutes otherwise arguably
prohibit.  Courts assume that congressional intent related to proxi-
mate cause resides only in narrow causal language and ignore that
Congress often expresses intent related to liability limits throughout
statutory regimes.  Indeed, in many instances Congress has provided a
complex system of interlocking liability limits that strongly suggests
that the space for proximate cause is not coterminous with the com-
mon law.  More importantly, if a modern statute contains gaps regard-
ing the extent of liability, there is no reason to generally assume those
gaps should be filled by reference to the common law.
Proximate cause is a notoriously flexible and theoretically incon-
sistent concept.  This Article argues that the term is often an empty
vessel, into which the courts can pour multiple meanings.  Courts
often use the broad idea of proximate cause as a framework for discus-
sion, selectively quoting available sources to reach a particular out-
come.  Proximate cause is so slippery and used in so many different
iterations, that it does not provide potential litigants with enough gui-
dance to judge the likely outcome of disputes either ex post or ex ante.
Anticipating increased future judicial forays into statutory proxi-
mate cause, this Article argues that courts must conduct more sophis-
ticated inquiries into whether statutes incorporate common law
proximate cause and demonstrates why courts should be reluctant to
import it.  It explains how courts can often use explicit statutory provi-
sions or other doctrines to limit liability.  It calls for courts to abolish
4 This Article does not consider how proximate cause should apply to criminal
statutes.
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interpretive canons that currently favor using proximate cause and
sets forth an architecture for courts to use in those instances when
proximate cause is needed.
Parts I and II provide the analytical groundwork for the Article by
providing examples of statutes that raise statutory proximate cause
problems and discussing proximate cause, separation of powers, and
statutory interpretation.  Part III demonstrates the faulty arguments
courts have used when engaging in statutory proximate cause inquir-
ies.  Part IV describes issues that make proximate cause especially
problematic with regard to statutes, arguing that many statutes do not
map well onto the traditional torts in which proximate cause devel-
oped.  Part V develops an architecture for statutory proximate cause
inquiries.
I. PROXIMATE CAUSE: THE WORK OF ALADDIN’S LAMP5
To consider whether proximate cause should enjoy a place in
statutes, it is first necessary to have an understanding of tort causation,
separation of powers, and statutory interpretation.  An exhaustive
description of these topics is not especially helpful to the task at hand,
especially given the extensive scholarship that deals with these subjects
individually.  Rather, this Part and the following one perform a fram-
ing function, identifying and defining the key attributes of these top-
ics relevant to the underlying inquiry.
At common law, causation often embraces two different kinds of
issues: cause in fact and legal or proximate cause.6  “Conduct is a fac-
tual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent
5 See Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471,
471–72 (1950) (“No other formula . . . so nearly does the work of Aladdin’s lamp.”).
For further discussion of proximate cause, see, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause
in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 51
(1991); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983) (endeavoring to analyze causation within an
economic paradigm of torts); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of
Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980) (defending causation
principles as a mechanism for maximizing social welfare); Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1740 (1985) (attempting to develop a
“more satisfactory” explanation of causation).
6 The distinction between these two concepts is often blurred. See Jane Staple-
ton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV.
941, 945 (2001) (recognizing the overlap between different aspects of causation and
arguing that cause-in-fact and normative judgments about liability should be clearly
distinguished).
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the conduct.”7  In some tort cases, such as negligence cases, factual
cause is a necessary, but not a sufficient basis for imposing liability on
a defendant for harm.  In these cases, courts impose a requirement of
legal cause, also called proximate cause.
Four attributes of proximate cause are important for purposes of
statutory analysis.  First, courts have not arrived at a consistent con-
cern or set of concerns that underlie it.  Second, proximate cause
inherently relates to policy.  While courts express proximate cause in
different ways, every iteration serves a liability-limiting function, in
that it further defines the scope of prohibited conduct in cases where
an actor can be described as factually causing an event.  Proximate
cause expresses a normative preference about where the line should
be drawn.  Third, the goals of proximate cause have evolved over time
and are still evolving.  Finally, courts vary the use of proximate cause
in tort cases, depending on whether the underlying tort is an inten-
tional one or not.  Together, these four attributes make it difficult to
apply proximate cause to statutes.
Defining proximate cause is notoriously tricky.8  Leading torts
commentators indicate that “[t]here is perhaps nothing in the entire
field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which
the opinions are in such a welter of confusion.”9  Considered broadly,
proximate cause is essentially concerned with problems regarding
intervening actions, a foreseeable plaintiff, the scope of risk of the
defendant’s actions, and/or policy concerns.10  While it is possible to
7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 (2010).
8 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 250, 1346 (9th ed. 2009) (providing multiple defi-
nitions for proximate cause and indicating that the following terms also reflect proxi-
mate cause: “direct cause,” “efficient cause,” “legal cause,” “procuring cause,” and
“remote cause,” among others); Kelley, supra note 5, at 51.  Further, the definition of R
proximate cause has changed over time. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. a (2010).
9 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at
263 (5th ed. 1984).
10 This section details the major components of proximate cause as they have
been expressed both in tort cases and in the Restatement.  The Restatement has recently
started to use the words “scope of liability” to refer to proximate cause and has also
focused the inquiry on the scope of risk. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. a (2010).  Applying the Restatement sections
to physical harm cases may not be appropriate in statutes where the harms are emo-
tional or economic in nature.  Reference to these sections is only meant to explain
the possible scope of proximate cause.  This section omits the direct test that is found
in early common law cases because of its waning relevance to modern proximate
cause inquiries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMO-
TIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. b (2010) (“[C]onduct need not be close in space or time to
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describe these concerns separately, in some cases, two or more con-
cerns overlap.
Some courts use proximate cause to determine whether some
intervening action cuts off the original actor’s liability.11  In thinking
about superseding cause, the court is often determining that the acts
of a third party interrupt the sequence of conduct, consequence, and
injury between the defendant and plaintiff such that the liability of
the defendant is no longer appropriate.12
At times proximate cause is concerned with reasonably antici-
pated consequences or the slightly different, but often related, ques-
tion of whether the harm caused was within the scope of risk of the
defendant’s conduct.13  Some courts have identified proximate cause
as considering whether the plaintiff was foreseeable.14  Each of these
iterations is hopelessly tied up in goals and policies related to the
underlying cause of action, because none of them can be defined irre-
spective of it.  And any of these iterations is likely to result in a wide
variety of potential outcomes.15
In some iterations, proximate cause is described without refer-
ence to any particular goal, but rather generally as line drawing, deter-
mining when as a matter of policy a defendant should not be liable,
even though its actions caused the injury in question.16  Importantly,
the plaintiff’s harm to be a proximate cause.”); Kelley, supra note 5, at 52.  However, R
courts continue to use words like direct and remote to define proximate cause.
11 The term “superseding cause” is often used to refer to an intervening force
that is sufficient to cut off liability from the original tortfeasor. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. b (2010).
12 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 970 (2010).
13 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 (2010) (“An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks
that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”); Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environ-
mental Law and the Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 688
(2008); Kelley, supra note 5, at 92.  The Restatement explains that the risk test is con- R
gruent with the foreseeability test, if the latter test is “properly understood and
framed.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29  cmt. e (2010).
14 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. f (2010) (discussing Palsgraf).
15 KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, § 42, at 274. R
16 See Stapleton, supra note 6, at 985–86 (listing the following concerns that R
might be involved in proximate cause line drawing:  “(1) the perceived purpose of the
recognition of a pocket of obligation in the circumstances; (2) the costs of legal rules
and their administration; (3) the dignity of the law; (4) the interest in individual
freedom; (5) the recklessness or intention to harm, if any, of the defendant; (6) the
relative wrongfulness of different actors; (7) the concern that the extent of liability
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five members of the Supreme Court have recently embraced this line-
drawing function of proximate cause.17  In a recent case the Court
explained that the term “proximate cause” is “shorthand for a con-
cept: Injuries have countless causes, and not all should give rise to
legal liability.”18  It then quoted the dissent in Palsgraf, which noted
that “because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of
justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a
certain point.”19
The Supreme Court has referred to proximate cause as a generic
label the courts use to describe “the judicial tools used to limit a per-
son’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own acts.”20
It also has quoted a noted torts treatise referring to proximate cause
as reflecting “ideas . . . of what is administratively possible and conve-
nient.”21  In this iteration, it appears the Court is more concerned
about proof issues.  For example, if an injury is less direct, it is more
difficult to determine how much of the plaintiff’s damages can be
traced to the violation (a factual causation issue) and whether the
courts would need to engage in complex decisions regarding how to
apportion damages among multiple plaintiffs to eliminate the risk of
multiple recoveries.22  These latter concerns are actually not proxi-
mate cause concerns, but courts often use proximate cause to resolve
these issues.
The Supreme Court has recently bemoaned the lack of consensus
regarding proximate cause definitions, noting that common law for-
mulations include, among others, “the immediate or nearest antece-
dent test; the efficient, producing cause test; the substantial factor
test; and the probable or natural and probable or foreseeable conse-
quence test.”23  Members of the Court cannot agree on what exactly
proximate cause is designed to accomplish.24  While five members of
the Court recently adopted the line-drawing account of proximate
cause, four members of the Court have stated that proximate cause
not be wholly out of proportion to the degree of wrongfulness; (8) the fact that the
defendant was acting in pursuit of commercial profit; [and] (9) whether allowance of
recovery for such consequences would be likely to open the way to fraudulent claims”
(footnotes omitted)).
17 See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011).
18 Id. at 2637.
19 Id. (quoting Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
20 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
21 Id. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, § 41, at 264). R
22 Id. at 269.
23 CSX, 131 S. Ct. at 2642 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 For another description of proximate cause, see Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,
547 U.S. 451, 469–70 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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relates to whether there is “some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,” whether the injuries are
“too remote, purely contingent, or indirect,” and whether the connec-
tion between the wrong and the injury are so “tenuous . . . that what is
claimed to be a consequence is only fortuity.”25
As demonstrated in the famous Palsgraf case, there is no clear line
separating one rationale from another, and court opinions regarding
proximate cause are typically difficult to reduce to a consistent line of
reasoning.26  At least one commentator has asserted that proximate
cause has no inherent meaning, but substitutes for other elements of
a cause of action when the decision on that element is difficult.27
Indeed, it is questionable whether proximate cause has a meaning
that is independent of the underlying cause of action to which it is
attached.
Recently, Chief Justice Roberts has suggested that a lack of fixed
meaning for proximate cause is not problematic.  Rather, proximate
cause is not meant to provide a mechanical or uniform test, but fur-
nishes “illustrations of situations which judicious men upon careful
consideration have adjudged to be on one side of the line or the
other.”28  While the Chief Justice is correct that proximate cause con-
cerns limits on liability, the rationales used to both justify the limit
and to decide where the line is drawn are incredibly important.  Dif-
ferent rationales may lead the courts to different results.
Importantly, the courts’ and commentators’ understanding of
proximate cause has changed over time and not necessarily in a
straight trajectory toward a more reasoned approach.29  Thus, early
iterations of proximate cause that required the event to be the nearest
in time or space have largely been rejected in recent iterations.30  The
Restatement (First) of Torts embraced an idea of legal cause that
included concepts from factual cause and proximate case analysis,
while the Restatement (Third) of Torts separates factual and proximate
cause.31  These changes over time are important because it makes it
25 CSX, 131 S. Ct. at 2645–46 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 838 (1996); Holmes, 503 U.S.
at 268–74).
26 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  Indeed, even in
Palsgraf, Justice Cardozo addressed concerns about causation as it relates to duty. Id.
at 99–100.
27 See Green, supra note 5, at 471. R
28 CSX, 131 S. Ct. at 2652 (quoting Exxon Co., 517 U.S. at 839).
29 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, § 42, at 276–79 (discussing various tests). R
30 Id. at 276.
31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 (2010); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 430 (1934) (indicating that to establish
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difficult for courts to borrow proximate cause ideas from one time
period and apply them to another.  In such instances, the courts may
be using the term “proximate cause,” but be referring to different
tests.
Not only does proximate cause have evolving contested underpin-
nings and goals, common law courts also apply it differently, depend-
ing on the nature of the underlying tort.  The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm notes that when an actor
intentionally causes harm he is liable, even if the harm was unlikely to
occur, and that intentional actors are liable for a broader range of
harms than negligent actors.32  In deciding the scope of liability, the
Restatement (Third) notes that the following play important roles in the
analysis: “the moral culpability of the actor . . . , the seriousness of
harm intended and threatened by those acts, and the degree to which
the actor’s conduct deviated from appropriate care.”33
Proximate cause rarely plays a role in intentional tort cases.34
There are many reasons for this.  In intentional tort cases “the defen-
dant’s wrongful conduct is closely linked—temporally and concep-
tually—to the plaintiff’s harm.”35  Few intentional tort cases involve
multiple causal factors.36  Further, the intent requirement makes it
clearer that the defendant should be held accountable for its actions,
and courts express less concern about extending liability in this con-
text.37  Thus, the necessity and strength of proximate cause doctrine
severely diminishes in the intentional tort context.  When proximate
cause is relevant in intentional tort cases, proximate cause analysis
legal cause the plaintiff must be in the class of persons to which the defendant’s
actions create a risk of causing harm); id. § 431 (defining legal cause as being a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the harm, without an exception to relieve the defen-
dant of responsibility); id. § 433 (defining legal cause with concepts such as whether
there was a continuous force or series of forces and whether the harm was highly
extraordinary given the defendant’s conduct).
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 33 (2010).  Some question whether traditional notions of proximate cause work well
in non-traditional common law tort cases. See Stapleton, supra note 6, at 946. R
33 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 33 (2010).  The Restatement view is even more nuanced, noting that where intent is
established by showing that the defendant was substantially certain, proximate cause
should not be as narrow as it is with other intent cases. Id. cmt. d.
34 Id. cmt. e (noting the “paucity” of legal opinions discussing proximate cause in
intentional tort cases).
35 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 811, 832 (2009).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 832–33.
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may cut off liability for the defendant in fewer circumstances than it
would when applied to negligence.38
As this Part demonstrates, the underlying goals of proximate
cause are multiple, contested, and evolving.  The use of proximate
cause varies across tort actions and many of proximate cause’s under-
lying concerns relate to policy concerns.  Each of these attributes of
proximate cause is central to the statutory proximate cause question.
II. STATUTES, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND INTERPRETATION
A. Hypothetical Statutes
This Article argues that to date, the Supreme Court has drawn
from a narrow stable of arguments to create a fairly standard, yet
coarse, analysis to consider when to apply proximate cause to statutes.
In almost every recent statutory proximate cause case, the Court has
applied proximate cause to the statute.39  To understand the
problems with this standard account, it is necessary to describe the
features of statutes where the standard analysis is problematic.
While it is impossible to describe the features of all federal stat-
utes, it is possible to describe four categories of features that highlight
the inadequacies of current statutory proximate cause analysis.  In
each category of cases, assume that Congress used the words “because
of” or some similar causal language to define when liability will occur
and did not use the term of art “proximate cause.”40
Category A. Imagine a statute with the following features.  Con-
gress enacted a statute that provides for liability that mimics common
law negligence, making only minor changes in the common law
regime.  The statute is fairly short and does not provide the courts
with much guidance on how to interpret the statutory terms.
Category B. Category B statutes are similar to those in Category
A with one important change.  When Congress enacted the statutes, it
38 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 33 (2010) (“An actor who intentionally or recklessly causes harm is subject to liabil-
ity for a broader range of harms than the harms for which that actor would be liable if
only acting negligently.”); id cmt. a (noting that its scope of risk standard is inade-
quate with respect to intentional torts); 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 421 (2004) (noting
that proximate cause applies in strict liability). But see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas
H. Koenig, Parens Patriae Litigation to Redress Societal Damages from the BP Oil Spill: The
Latest Stage in the Evolution of Crimtorts, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 68 (asserting
that courts do not typically apply proximate cause to strict liability).
39 See cases cited infra note 79. R
40 These categories are used to make the Article’s analysis more concrete.  Some
statutes may have traits that do not fall within any category or that combine some
traits of multiple categories.
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did not base fault on negligence, but rather required intentional
conduct.
Category C. Category C statutes may have negligence or intent-
based fault standards, but they differ from the statutes in Categories A
and B because the statutes do not contain fairly short operative provi-
sions.  Rather, Congress enacted a complex regime that speaks to lia-
bility limits in various types of provisions.  For example, these statutes
might describe who can sue or be sued, the type of conduct that is
prohibited, and the type of conduct that is allowed under the statute.
Category D.  The Category D statutes are radically different from
the statutes in either Category A or B.  The statutes use fault models
that do not mimic traditional tort categories such as negligence.  In
fact, these statutes radically alter common law expectations and obli-
gations.  Like Category C statutes, these statutes contain numerous
expressions about liability limits throughout the statute.  Congress
also enacted these statutes in the past several decades.
The current arguments used in statutory proximate cause cases
are problematic in each category but raise especially important sepa-
ration of powers concerns in Categories C and D.  In Category D
cases, the standard account ignores the relationship of modern stat-
utes and the common law, by assuming modern statutes are grounded
in the common law.  In Category C and D cases, the standard account
causes courts to ignore congressional expressions about liability limits.
In Category B and D cases (and some in Category C) the courts are
making incorrect assumptions about tort law by assuming proximate
cause applies evenly across all tort regimes.  Even in Category A cases,
where applying common law proximate cause seems most appropri-
ate, the standard arguments ignore problems raised by the evolving
and contested nature of proximate cause.  Taken together, these four
examples demonstrate that the courts should not apply a uniform
analysis to statutory proximate cause questions.
B. Statutory Interpretation as an Expression of Institutional Competition
Under the Constitution, Congress is vested with legislative power,
and the courts have the power to interpret the laws that Congress cre-
ates.41  Separation of powers thus contemplates a line between con-
struing an existing statutory regime and creating a statutory regime.42
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
42 This sentence is not meant to imply that the Constitution carefully defines
where this line is to be drawn. POPKIN, supra note 3, at 44 (“All that was clear was that R
the boundaries within which judges operated . . . were narrower than those set by the
formal principle of parliamentary sovereignty in England.”).  Further, it may be diffi-
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This Article coins the term “statutory proximate cause” to highlight
that a court’s obligations are different when it is using proximate
cause in statutes, than when the court is acting in a common law
capacity.
Consider the following example.  Assume that a statute clearly
indicates that only employers with fifteen or more employees can be
sued.  If the courts interpreted the statute as allowing employers with
only six employees to be sued, the courts would likely be violating
separation of powers principles by creating new requirements in a stat-
utory regime in contravention of express statutory language.  Even if
Congress has the power to override such a decision by subsequent
action,43 the courts would have violated core constitutional principles
under almost all statutory interpretation theories.44
Admittedly, most statutory interpretation implicates more diffi-
cult questions than the prior hypothetical, often because Congress has
not spoken clearly or at all about its choice regarding a particular
legal question.  Further, there is strong disagreement regarding the
appropriate role of the courts in making statutory inquiries, such as
whether the courts should only consider Congress’s expectations as
actually expressed in statutory language, whether they should arrive at
intent from other sources, or whether courts have broader powers to
engage in common law decision making or decision making that
relies on the broader purposes of the underlying statutory regimes.45
These are the tensions inherent in competing models of statutory
interpretation.46
Courts considering statutory proximate cause questions rarely
describe how they are undertaking their constitutional role, including
cult for courts to separate the tasks of interpretation and rulemaking, since the judici-
ary performs both functions, but in different contexts.  J.M. Balkin, Review Essay,
Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 928 (1988).
43 See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 520–21 (2009)
(discussing separation of powers concerns in the context of congressional statutory
amendments).
44 See Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 395 (1942) (“No
American court has probably ever declared that it might, if it chose, disregard a
statute.”).
45 See generally CALABRESI, supra note 3 (arguing that courts should play a role in R
diminishing the importance of outdated statutes); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (arguing for a more fluid notion of statutory inter-
pretation); POPKIN, supra note 3 (discussing the role of the courts in statutory R
interpretation).
46 See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 20 (1988) (describing various statutory interpretation techniques).
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how they are balancing statutory language and purpose with the com-
mon law.47  To date, courts have failed to emphasize the important
difference between pure common law decision making and statutory
interpretation.  In the statutory context, the courts should be consid-
ering the commands of the legislative and executive branches regard-
ing the underlying statutory regime and respecting the appropriate
balance between judicial, legislative, and executive power.  In the
common law context, when judges are placing limits on causes of
action, they are often limiting doctrines that the judiciary itself cre-
ated.  In contrast, with statutory proximate cause cases, the courts are
often being asked to place a court-created limit on a legislatively cre-
ated cause of action.48
There is special reason to be concerned about separation of pow-
ers issues regarding proximate cause.  At its core, proximate cause is a
policy question about how far liability should extend in a particular
instance.  Given its contested foundations and its indeterminacy, it is
important to question whether courts are creating law when they
decide statutory proximate cause questions.  This is especially true
when courts fail to consider statutory guidance about the limits of lia-
bility49 and when court analysis is shallow and unconvincing.
C. Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation is a complex task that is the subject of
deep debate within legal and academic circles.  For purposes of this
discussion, three aspects of statutory interpretation are important: its
goals, the techniques used to reach those goals, and its temporal
orientation.
Given the wide-ranging discussions about statutory interpretation
in academic literature, it is necessary to begin this Part with a few cave-
ats.  First, this Part does not make any evaluative or normative claim
about the value of any particular statutory construction methodology.
Rather, it simply describes the most commonly used methodologies to
determine whether the courts might use them to incorporate proxi-
mate cause analysis.  Second, the Part does not suggest that statutory
interpretation can be neatly pressed into the described categories.
There is much debate within the academic community about where
47 See infra note 79 (identifying a variety of cases in which courts apply proximate R
cause).
48 See, e,g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (considering
proximate cause under USERRA when proximate cause is not needed to resolve the
question before the Court).
49 See infra Part III.E.
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the delineations between the methodologies lie.  Third, this Part does
not exhaustively discuss statutory interpretation, a topic that has been
widely and well considered in a variety of books and articles.50  Rather,
it discusses the kinds of statutory interpretation methods that courts
have used or might use with regards to statutory proximate cause and
serves as background for later critiques of how courts purport to use
these methods.
When courts interpret statutes, they draw from a menu of meth-
odologies, such as textualism, intentionalism, purposivism, and com-
mon law decision making,51 each with its own underlying goals and
techniques.52  These methodologies are often the ways that courts
express their belief about their authority to make a particular decision
about a statute.53  In addition to these methodologies, judges also
have opinions about whether construction is originalist in its orienta-
tion or whether it allows for the meaning of words to develop over
50 See generally POPKIN, supra note 3, at 7–115 (tracing the history of statutory R
interpretation); J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743
(1987) (discussing how deconstructionist principles apply to interpretation); Carlos
E. Gonza´lez, Turning Unambiguous Statutory Materials into Ambiguous Statutes: Ordering
Principles, Avoidance, and Transparent Justification in Cases of Interpretive Choice, 61 DUKE
L.J. 583 (2011) (discussing how statutory interpretation lacks ordering rules).  Addi-
tional articles are cited throughout this section.
51 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 78 (2006) (noting that the line between textualism and purposivism is not
“cut-and-dried”); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 355–56 (2005)
(noting situations where textualist interpretive methods overlap with other methods).
William Popkin describes the process of statutory construction as “moving back and
forth between words and other indicia of meaning without preconceived notions
about whether the words are clear.”  William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of
Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 594 (1988).  William Eskridge and Philip
Frickey similarly describe the process as “polycentric” and not “linear and purely
deductive.”  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Prac-
tical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 348 (1990).  Indeed they suggest “that an inter-
preter will look at a broad range of evidence—text, historical evidence, and the text’s
evolution—-and thus form a preliminary view of the statute.” Id. at 352.  This view
would then be refined by political and other considerations. Id. at 347.  They also
suggest that different methods should be accorded different weights in the considera-
tion process, with the text enjoying primacy. Id. at 353–54.
52 See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 429 n.6 (noting that textualists, purposivists and intentionalists disa-
gree about how and whether to recognize gaps and what to do if the statute has gaps,
or vague or ambiguous provisions).
53 See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statu-
tory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593–94 (1995) (noting that to engage in
statutory construction courts must adopt “at least implicitly—a theory about [their]
own role by defining the goal and methodology of the interpretive enterprise and by
taking an institutional stance in relation to the legislature”).
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time.  This Article shows how, in many instances, courts rely on weak
claims to justify applying proximate cause to statutes.54
Statutory construction usually begins with a court’s attempt to
find the plain meaning of a statute.  This search for meaning often
begins with the text of the statute.  One method of statutory interpre-
tation, textualism, considers the text to be the primary or sole inter-
pretative object.  Although the meaning of textualism is itself
debated,55 its key feature is the primacy of the statutory language in
determining statutory meaning, without considering legislative his-
tory.56  A textualist methodology often relies on the dictionary mean-
ing of words, whether the words are terms of art, the grammatical
structure of a statute, and the meaning of the contested words across
the statutory regime.57
In contrast to textualism, judges using an intentionalist method-
ology are often trying to determine the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the text of the statute and other sources, such as legisla-
tive history.58  For purposes of this discussion it is possible to ignore
54 See infra Part III.
55 See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287 (2010)
(exploring the evolution of textualism and critiques of first-generation textualism’s
premises); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990) (examining new textualism in comparison to the traditional approach); Philip
P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1087, 1090 (1995) (discussing
“new textualism” and its tendency to merge with other interpretive methods); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995) (expressing con-
cern over the Supreme Court’s extreme reliance on textualist tools).
56 But see Manning, supra note 51, at 78 (“Properly understood, textualism is not R
and could not be defined either by a strict preference for enacted text over
unenacted context, or by a wholesale rejection of the utility of purpose.”); Nelson,
supra note 51, at 355 (noting that textualism may not be so narrowly defined and R
suggesting that consideration of the purpose behind a statute is countenanced by the
textualist approach).  Nelson further suggests that textualists may be just as con-
cerned about the intent of the legislators as intentionalists, but believe that legislative
history is more likely to provide an inaccurate picture of the collective legislature’s
intent.  Id. at 362–63.  Further, there is strong disagreement regarding whether the
courts are required to determine the meaning of the statute at the time of its enact-
ment or whether the meaning of the statute can vary over time. See Aleinikoff, supra
note 46, at 21. R
57 See Manning, supra note 55, at 1309 n.101. R
58 The term “intentionalist” may be used to describe several different methods of
statutory construction that allow the use of legislative history and other signals of
intent, but these methods may differ significantly. See Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Tex-
tualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 366–67 (1994); see
also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 51, at 325–27 (highlighting the difference between R
“actual intent” and “conventional intent” strains of intentionalism).
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questions about when intent comes into play in such an analysis and
the difficulties inherent in determining legislative intent,59 to focus on
whether there is any indication either inside or outside the statutory
language that suggests a congressional intent to use proximate cause.
In some instances, textualism and intentionalism provide the
same answer to the interpretive question because the legislature
expressed its intent in the actual language of the statute.  However, in
more difficult cases, the text and other sources of legislative intent
point in different directions.
The third way jurists commonly interpret statutes is by consider-
ing whether the broad purposes of a statute support a particular inter-
pretation.60  For example, a court might look to the broad, remedial
purposes of a statutory regime to serve as a guide on whether to read a
particular statutory provision broadly or narrowly.61  The statute’s pur-
pose is sometimes stated within the statute itself or within its legislative
history.  At times, courts assign a particular statute a purpose or set of
purposes.
A fourth method courts use to interpret statutes is a common law
methodology.  This method has been described as allowing courts to
consider “current values, such as ideas of fairness, related statutory
polices, and constitutional values” without masking these considera-
tions as textual, intent, or purpose concerns.62
Courts often use common law reasoning with respect to statutory
regimes when the statute was designed to codify existing common law.
In these instances, “the resulting statute might well be interpreted as
maintaining a significant role for further judicial development and
refinement of the law.”63  Courts sometimes use this method when
preemptive lawmaking is required to preserve the statutory mandate.
Preemptive lawmaking might be required when “collateral or subsidi-
ary rules are necessary in order to effectuate or to avoid frustrating the
59 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 45, at 16–25 (discussing difficulties with locating use- R
ful expressions of intent); Nelson, supra note 51, at 362–63 (describing Justice Scalia’s R
concern that legislators might “salt the Congressional Record with misleading statements
that further their own special agendas” if courts find the entire legislature’s intent in
such isolated statements).
60 See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861–62 (2005).
61 See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. EEOC, 405 F.3d 840, 846 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005)
(noting that definitions in statute must be read broadly to effectuate the statute’s
liberal purpose).
62 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 51, at 359.  The author is not expressing an R
opinion about the validity of common-law decision making.
63 Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1618 (2011).
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specific intentions of the draftsmen.”64  Courts also use common law
reasoning to create federal common law related to a statute when
Congress has granted the courts the authority to round out a statutory
regime, either expressly or implicitly.65
Whatever method a court uses, courts sometimes use common
law principles as persuasive authority to interpret particular statutory
language.  Courts have used the common law as a gap filler when
traditional statutory construction techniques fail.66  Gaps may occur
for many reasons, including when the statute is ambiguous, when it
contains inconsistent provisions, or when it appears that Congress sim-
ply failed to address a particular issue in a particular regime.67
Another line of statutory interpretation would allow a judge to
use pragmatic reasoning or practical reasoning.68  These theories of
statutory interpretation reject any grand theory of interpretation and
instead reason that judges should look to relevant statutory language,
available legislative history, “the context in which the legislation was
enacted, the overall legal landscape, and the lessons of common sense
and good policy.”69
Further, some commentators favor dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion, in which courts interpret a statute based not only on its text and
historical context, but on its “present societal, political, and legal con-
text.”70  Under this approach a court would be permitted to weigh the
text and the history of the statute, with current values and policies, as
well as subsequent changes in society and law.71
For purposes of this discussion, it is important to note that judges
also may rely on certain canons of construction, including canons that
64 Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 36 (1985).
65 See id. at 40.
66 See id. at 5; see also William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion,
and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 662–67 (1982)
(discussing common law interpretation).
67 See Merrill, supra note 64, at 33. R
68 See generally Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation
Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than Judicial Literal-
ism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231 (1996) (arguing for a pragmatic approach to inter-
preting environmental regulations).
69 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 51, at 321. R
70 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1479 (1987).
71 See id. at 1484.
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allow the judge to presume that statutes are adopted against a back-
ground of common law.72
To properly apply tort concepts to a statute, the courts should
convincingly invoke one or more of the accepted reasons for doing so:
the statutory language contains the principle, there is evidence that
the legislature intended the application of the principle, the statutory
goals call for the principle, there is a proper basis for common law
decision making, pragmatic considerations justify it, or evolving socie-
tal understandings call for proximate cause.  If, after applying one or
more of these methodologies, the interpretation of a statute is still
unclear, the courts may rely on agency interpretations of the statute,
using administrative deference doctrines.73
In addition to deciding whether a basis exists for using proximate
cause, the court must also determine whether proximate cause should
be viewed at the time of the statute’s enactment or at the time of the
court’s opinion.74  As discussed in Part III.C., to date the courts have
largely ignored this temporal question.
When modern courts consider statutory proximate cause ques-
tions they largely rely on statutory interpretation arguments.75  In
other words, they appear to be claiming to act within a constitutional
space defined by the boundaries of traditional statutory interpreta-
tion, by considering the text of the statute, its purposes, or congres-
sional intent.76  The next Part shows how many of these traditional
arguments are faulty or weak.
This Article does not contend that the only constitutionally per-
missible space is defined by traditional statutory interpretation.  To
the extent that courts are claiming the right to engage in pure com-
mon law decision making, they should do so explicitly.77  It is difficult
to determine a court’s motivation or goals with respect to proximate
72 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005).
73 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).  Under the Chevron doctrine, courts will defer to an agency’s construction of a
statute when the underlying statutory regime is silent or ambiguous regarding the
particular question, when the agency’s interpretation is permissible, and when Con-
gress has granted authority to the agency to interpret the statute. Id. at 843–44.
74 See Eskridge, supra note 70, at 1484. R
75 See supra note 51. R
76 See infra Part III.  This Article does not argue that courts must rely on these
kinds of arguments to properly import proximate cause.  Rather, it demonstrates why
courts must, at least, provide convincing arguments about why they are invoking prox-
imate cause so that it is possible to determine whether the courts are acting within an
appropriate constitutional space.
77 See CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 105. R
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cause if it does not honestly set forth the assumptions under which it
is working.  Most importantly, to engage the important conversation
about how modern statutes should interact with the common law, it is
critical to understand how courts approach this inquiry.  Under the
current model, it is difficult to tell whether the courts simply do not
fully understand the consequences of their decisions, whether they
misunderstand tort law, or whether they are using legal fictions for
other purposes.
Interpretive questions about proximate cause issues are especially
complex because the space for arguably appropriate court action var-
ies according to the statutory regime.  A statute that specifically adopts
the words “proximate cause” is different than a statute that carefully
expounds the limits of liability.
A judge’s individual beliefs about statutory interpretation also
affect how he or she perceives the arguable space.  Likewise, the
potential space for proximate cause might be different depending on
the reason courts provide for invoking it.  For example, courts would
be using proximate cause inappropriately in cases where the statute
clearly speaks to the limits of liability, but the courts just disagree with
where the line should be drawn.  On the other hand, courts might
have greater or different appropriate roles to play if the case before
them was truly unanticipated by Congress or if the court was invoking
the concept to protect fundamental values.78  However, even in these
latter cases, this Article argues that there are reasons to reject using
proximate cause to reach these goals.
III. CORE INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS WITH STATUTORY
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The Supreme Court has increasingly applied proximate cause to
statutes.79  This Part discusses key arguments courts use when
78 See POPKIN, supra note 3, at 48 (discussing how courts might play a more robust R
role in statutory interpretation when protecting fundamental values).
79 See, e.g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (applying proxi-
mate cause to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of
1994 (USERRA)); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453 (2006) (restat-
ing that proximate cause is required to sue under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO)); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
342–346 (2005) (requiring proximate cause for claims involving securities fraud);
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 703–04 (2004) (examining proximate causa-
tion with respect to the Federal Tort Claims Act); Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314,
325–26 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing proximate causation as being
required by language in the Bankruptcy Code); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp.,
503 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1992) (requiring proximate cause for a successful claim under
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approaching this interpretive task.  It demonstrates how courts often
rely on weak arguments or on assumptions that cannot be applied
generally to all statutes, while failing to realize how key aspects of
proximate cause make it especially problematic when used in statutes.
The arguments courts deploy to justify using proximate cause appear
to be innocuous but actually conceal numerous unanswered questions
about how statutes interact with the common law.
A. Weak Textualist Claims
The clearest case for applying proximate cause would be if the
statute itself expressly uses the words “proximate cause.”  Congress has
used these words in many statutes.80  One strong argument against
implying proximate cause from general causal language is that Con-
gress understands how to designate proximate cause by name.81
Most statutes do not use the words “proximate cause.”  Courts
often find general causal language in a statute, such as the words
“because of” or “by reason of,” and then conclude that these terms
RICO); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 535–36 (1983) (discussing proximate cause in relation to a claim under
the Clayton Act); see also, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767
(2004) (reasoning that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires a
causal standard similar to proximate cause); Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S.
830, 839–41 (1996) (discussing proximate cause in admiralty context, not in statutory
context); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713
(1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing proximate causation as related to the
Endangered Species Act (ESA)); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 536–37 (1995) (discussing whether language in the Exten-
sion of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act required proximate causation). But see, e.g., CSX
Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2641–44 (2011) (refusing to import tradi-
tional common law proximate cause into FELA, but holding that the statutory lan-
guage has a different proximate cause limit).
80 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2006) (providing that plaintiffs may recover
damages in excess of cap if a showing of proximate cause is made); Act of June 5,
1924, ch. 261, § 2, 43 Stat. 389 (stating that the United States would be liable for “any
disease proximately caused by [federal] employment”); Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 105,
§ 306, 40 Stat. 398, 407 (stating that the United States would be liable to member of
Armed Forces for post-discharge disability that “proximately result[ed] from [a pre-
discharge] injury”); Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458, § 1, 39 Stat. 742, 742–43 (stating that
the United States would not be liable to an injured employee whose “intoxication . . .
is the proximate cause of the injury”).
81 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998).
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refer to both cause in fact and proximate cause.82  This argument
often serves as an anchor for statutory proximate cause analysis.83
This is a weak textualist claim because it allows courts to anchor
common law proximate cause by using any general causal language in
a statute, whether or not the statute’s words mimic the words the com-
mon law uses.  These claims also fail to consider the complexity of
proximate cause.  Proximate cause as used in the Article is a concept
drawn from tort law.  To the extent that some statutory regimes are
unlike common law torts, it is not clear why causal language would be
assumed to mean proximate cause, or at least not a proximate cause
standard that is coterminous with the common law.  Using the com-
mon law seems especially suspect for statutory regimes that radically
alter the common law, such as civil rights legislation.
Even if a statute is tort-like, proximate cause does not apply
evenly across all tort regimes.  Proximate cause plays a different role
in intentional tort cases than it does in negligence cases.  If a statute
provides an intentional tort, it is unlikely that general causal language
is meant to express robust proximate cause.  Further, the liability lim-
iting principles that underlie proximate cause may be expressed in
places other than the causal language.  Focusing solely on general
causal language can diminish other portions of the statutory regime.
Each of these problems is discussed in more detail in subsequent sec-
tions of this Article.
At best, the use of general causal language makes it possible to
claim that Congress meant for proximate cause principles to limit the
statute.  However, this is not a sufficient argument, on its own, to jus-
tify statutory proximate cause.  This is because it is also possible that
Congress intended to use general causal language to refer to cause in
fact and did not necessarily intend proximate cause.  Unlike the term
“proximate cause,” other causal language, such as “because of” or “by
reason of” are not always terms of art and cannot automatically be
equated with proximate cause.  Further, general causal language will
not indicate which version of proximate cause the court should use
and also will not inform courts whether proximate cause is cotermi-
nous with the common law.
The courts will always need more than general causal language to
credibly argue that the statute should include common law proximate
cause.  For many regimes, the statute contains no extra indicators of
congressional intent regarding proximate cause.  This Article argues
82 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 266–68.
83 See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. 527 at 536 (indicating that “caused by” lan-
guage in statute requires proximate cause).
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that in such cases, courts should be reluctant to apply proximate cause
to the statute.  It also argues that courts should be careful about using
proximate cause even when there are other indications that general
causal language could be construed to mean proximate cause.
B. Weak Intent and Purpose Claims
Courts have used two weak intent claims to recognize proximate
cause: that the particular statute derives from a common law tradition
and that civil statutes in general are presumed to draw from a com-
mon law tradition.84  When applying proximate cause, courts also use
a weak purpose-based argument: that it is unlikely that Congress
meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover.
The first intent-based argument courts use to justify proximate
cause is the idea that the underlying cause of action derived from a
common law tradition that incorporated proximate cause analysis.85
An example of this argument is helpful to understand it.
In Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, the Supreme Court considered whether plaintiffs
had standing to sue under the Clayton Act.86  The Clayton Act allows
“‘[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws’” to file suit.87  The
Clayton Act does not specifically reference proximate cause; however,
in framing the standing issue, the Court noted the corollaries between
antitrust standing and proximate cause.88
The Court characterized its inquiry as trying to determine what
Congress intended.89  The Court noted that the Clayton Act language
was originally enacted as part of the Sherman Act in 1890, and it
looked to the passage of the earlier act to resolve the standing issue.90
Even though the Court did not cite any discussion of proximate cause
in the debates leading to the Sherman Act, the Court noted that there
84 It is possible that a particular statute’s legislative history or purpose may
directly discuss proximate cause; however, the major recent Supreme Court opinions
have not relied on such arguments.  For examples, see the cases cited supra note 79. R
85 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529–31 (1983).
86 Id. at 519.  In this case a union and other plaintiffs alleged that a multi-
employer association violated antitrust laws by, among other things, coercing certain
third parties and association members to enter into agreements with nonunion firms.
Id. at 520.
87 Id. at 529 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)).
88 See id. at 531–36.
89 Id. at 530.
90 Id. at 529.
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were general discussions about state common law with regard to reme-
dies and other definitional terms.91  Further, the Court noted that
Congress appeared to have been “generally aware” that the statute
would be “construed by common-law courts in accordance with tradi-
tional canons.”92
The Court noted that while the language of the Clayton Act does
not appear to limit liability for harm, its broad language, combined
with the fact that it was enacted against a common law backdrop sug-
gests that the language is subject to common law limitations.  Given
the unhelpfulness of the text, the Court reasoned it was required to
evaluate “the plaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defend-
ants, and the relationship between them.”93
A second intent-based argument that courts make is that civil stat-
utes in general are presumed to be adopted against a backdrop of tort
law.  In Staub v. Proctor Hospital,94 the Supreme Court held that an
employer may be liable for discrimination when an employee with dis-
criminatory animus influenced, but did not make, the challenged
employment decision.95  The plaintiff in the case sued under the Uni-
formed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
(USERRA), which prohibits discrimination against an individual
because of his or her military status.96  To determine the meaning of
USERRA’s motivating factor language, the Court started with the pre-
mise that “when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the back-
ground of general tort law.”97  In Staub, the Court made no inquiry
into whether Congress adopted USERRA specifically using the com-
mon law as a background.
Noticeably, the Court never fully engaged questions regarding
whether it had the authority to apply proximate cause to USERRA.
Rather, it assumed that because USERRA is a “tort,” that it embraces
proximate cause.98
Courts also rely on a purpose-based argument to justify proximate
cause: that it is unlikely Congress intended to allow all factually
injured plaintiffs to recover.  For example, in Holmes v. Securities Inves-
91 Id. at 531.
92 Id. at 531 n.22.
93 Id. at 535.
94 131 S.Ct. 1186 (2011)
95 Id. at 1194
96 Id. at 1190–91.
97 Id. at 1191.  The proximate cause discussion in Staub is arguably dicta.  None-
theless, it highlights an approach courts use to import proximate cause into statutes.
98 See id. at 1193.
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tor Protection Corp.99 the Court considered whether a plaintiff could
recover under RICO.  In doing so, it interpreted a provision that pro-
vides: “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasona-
ble attorney’s fee.”100  Although it is not entirely clear whether the
Court was discussing standing or proximate cause, it drew on proxi-
mate cause principles.101
The Court reasoned that it was unlikely Congress meant to allow
all factually injured plaintiffs to recover and used proximate cause in
its RICO analysis.102  The Court’s analysis is highly derivative, starting
from the premise that Congress modeled RICO on the Clayton Act.103
Thus, the case heavily relies on Associated General Contractors.104  The
Court noted that prior to 1914, lower federal courts had read the
Sherman Act to incorporate common law principles of proximate
cause.105  Reasoning from past precedent that construed RICO’s lan-
guage to derive from the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, the Court
noted that congressional use of the Sherman Act language “presuma-
bly carried the intention to adopt ‘the judicial gloss that avoided a
simple literal interpretation.’”106
These legislative intent and purpose arguments are weak for sev-
eral reasons.  None of them rely on any direct expressions of congres-
sional intent or purpose related to proximate cause specifically.
Further, these intent arguments rest on inaccurate assumptions.
As explored throughout this Article, few statutes only codify the
common law.  Even those that rely heavily on the common law change
it in important respects, such as by providing a limited remedy or by
defining key terms.  This Article argues that these additional provi-
99 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
100 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).  The Court quotes a truncated version of this stat-
ute in its opinion, however the statute is quoted in its entirety here. See Holmes, 503
U.S. at 258.
101 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 266 n.10.
102 Id. at 266.  There also was a question in the case whether the Court granted
certiorari on the issue of whether the statute required proximate cause. Id. at 266
n.12.  The proximate cause analysis in the case is also intertwined with issues related
to standing. See Virginia G. Maurer, Holmes v. SPIC: A New Direction for RICO Stand-
ing?, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (1992).
103 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267.
104 See id. at 266–68.
105 Id. at 267.
106 Id. at 268 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Coun-
cil of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983)).
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sions often express congressional intent regarding the same goals
addressed by proximate cause.  Honest statutory interpretation
requires courts to value these express provisions, which are more spe-
cific than general causal language and the amorphous intent claims
used by the courts.  When courts rely on general arguments about
intent or purpose, they often ignore express provisions of the statute
that speak to liability limits.
Further, the intent and purpose arguments are logically suspect
as a general proposition.  They ignore the changing relationship
between statutes and the common law that has been noted for more
than 100 years.107  Many statues expressly abrogate common law
understandings of legal rights and obligations.  Indeed, some statutes
radically upset traditional common law duties.108  It is odd that these
statutes would be read in tandem with common law limitations.  For
modern statutes, it is no longer fair to assume that they are derived
from the common law.109
These intent and purpose arguments are buttressed by a faulty
canon of construction that requires that Congress specifically indicate
its intent to not adopt common law principles.110  However, this pre-
sumption, if it is valid at all, should only apply to statutory regimes
that mimic traditional common law torts for which proximate cause is
usually invoked.  If the statute in question does not do so, there is no
reason to think that Congress needed to expressly or implicitly reject
proximate cause.
It also is highly problematic to assume that Congress under-
stands, in any meaningful way, what legislating against a backdrop of
common law means in any particular regime.  As a general matter, the
common law itself is so vast that it is unlikely that a large percentage of
the members of Congress understand it and then also understand
how it would interact with specific statutory language.  There is even
more reason to be skeptical of this argument in the context of proxi-
mate cause, which is an evolving doctrine with contested rationales.
Even when a statute does fall within a tort-like tradition, placing it
within that organizational box provides little information about which
version of proximate cause the courts should apply.
107 See Pound, supra note 3 (arguing that legislation must be respected by the
courts as much as, if not more than, the common law).
108 See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 29 U.S.C.); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
109 See CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 5. R
110 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 712
(1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Even if there is some reason to think that Congress wanted courts
to apply proximate cause or that some other reason demanded it,
there also is little reason to believe that the common law idea of proxi-
mate cause should be the sole or even primary source in determining
liability limitations.  In some cases, courts should consider whether
principles of administrative deference require them to look to regula-
tions.111  For some statutes, it is more likely that Congress intended
the interstices to be filled by an administrative agency.  Other adminis-
trative guidance, as well as the “gravitational force” of other statutes,
might also be appropriate sources for an inquiry into liability
limitation.112
It might be plausibly argued that Congress, in some general
sense, wants the courts to be able to place sensible limits on statutes.
This purpose argument is weak because there is little reason to
assume that proximate cause is the only or even the best way to limit a
statute’s reach or to avoid absurd results.113  As discussed in more
detail below, courts often use proximate cause as a proxy for other
concerns.114  For example, courts turn to proximate cause instead of
dealing with complex issues of factual causation.  Statutes might
directly address these other issues, as well as proximate cause, through
various statutory provisions that fall outside general causal language.
Even if proximate cause is the appropriate liability limiter, the courts
must still determine its meaning from multiple evolving and contested
goals.  This Article argues that as a matter of prudence, courts should
be reluctant to turn to proximate cause to resolve liability limitation
problems.
C. Confusing Common Law Techniques with the Common Law
In many statutory proximate cause cases, courts appear to be
using common law decision making techniques.115  Many courts con-
flate common law techniques with a requirement that the common
111 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (considering several cases regarding the method of enactment by States of the
Clean Air Act and EPA regulations); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)
(considering an action brought under Fair Labor Stands Act in light of the opinions
of the Administrator as appointed under the act).
112 CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 98. R
113 For example, courts have long claimed the ability to interpret a statute in ways
that avoid absurd results. See POPKIN, supra note 3, at 18, 20 (1999) (discussing how, R
in the 1600s, judges interpreted statutes so as to avoid absurd results).
114 See infra Part V.
115 See Baxter, supra note 66, at 662–67 (discussing why the Sherman Act might be
more susceptible to common law decision making techniques); see, e.g., Associated
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law be used to fill statutory gaps.  The second premise does not neces-
sarily follow from the first.
This confusion results because, in some cases, the courts appear
to both be using a common law methodology and applying that meth-
odology to a statute that the court claims derives from the common
law.  For example, when interpreting the Sherman Act, the courts
often claim to use common law techniques and claim that the statute
itself derives from the common law.116  This conflation is problematic
in other statutory proximate cases, where the statute does not gener-
ally derive from the common law.
The reach to common law decision making, however, does not
resolve the question of which underlying substantive law to use to
make the decision.  For some statutes, there may be credible argu-
ments that the common law should provide the substantive law.  How-
ever, for many statutes, the strongest argument that can be made is
that the common law is persuasive authority to help resolve the causal
question.  In these latter instances, judges are not and should not be
claiming that they are required to apply common law principles.  If
judges give primacy to the common law in these latter cases, they
should describe why they are looking to the common law, rather than
to other sources of meaning, such as the meaning of terms in similar
statutes, agency interpretations, or the general purpose of the under-
lying statute or field of law.
D. The Temporal Orientation Problem
A judge considering a statutory proximate cause argument must
determine the relevant point in time at which to view proximate
cause.  Judges differ regarding how they view the appropriate role of
the court when interpreting statutory language.  An originalist
approach to statutory interpretation attempts to capture the meaning
of the text at the time it was enacted.117  Other approaches to statu-
tory construction allow the meaning to develop over time.118
Despite the rigorous ongoing debate about originalism and dyna-
mism, the courts largely ignore these issues when deciding statutory
proximate cause cases.  As discussed throughout this Article, the
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531
(1983).
116 See Baxter, supra note 66, at 662–67.
117 See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 n.7 (1990) (indicating
that the will of Congress is a “will expressed and fixed in a particular enactment”).
118 See generally CALABRESI, supra note 3 (discussing the variety of circumstances R
under which statutes are passed, and the challenges posed for the courts by this
variety).
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meaning of proximate cause has not remained historically stable and
continues to evolve.  In theory then, a judge who considers a statutory
proximate cause problem from an originalist perspective may there-
fore be conceiving a very different version of proximate cause than a
judge considering the modern meaning of the words “proximate
cause.”
To date, court decisions have largely been oblivious to the evolv-
ing nature of proximate cause.  Consider the Supreme Court’s opin-
ion in Holmes, in which the Court used a judicial gloss applied to the
Sherman Act in the early 1900s119 to RICO, which was enacted in
1970s.  In doing so, the Court indicated that “[w]e may fairly credit
the 91st Congress, which enacted RICO, with knowing the interpreta-
tion federal courts had given the words earlier Congresses had
used.”120  As discussed later, it is strange for the Court to presume this.
The one thing that is certain about proximate cause is that its underly-
ing goals are contested and evolving.  Even if Congress knew that
courts applied proximate cause principles to the Sherman Act, it is a
stretch to also reason that Congress understood the particular version
of proximate cause that courts applied to the Sherman Act.
Importantly, Palsgraf, which is considered to be a leading case
regarding proximate cause, was not decided until 1928, well after the
passage of the Sherman Act.121  The Restatement (First) of Torts was
issued in the 1930s.122  Thus, it appears that when the Court is recog-
nizing proximate cause principles by derivative reasoning from the
Sherman Act, it is not referring to the more modern iterations of
proximate cause expressed in either Palsgraf or the Restatement (First)
of Torts, but rather to earlier rationales.  Indeed, the Court noted that
in the RICO context, Congress used the Clayton Act language, which
is derivative of language from the Sherman Act.  The Court noted:
“[W]e can only assume it intended them to have the same meaning
that courts had already given them.”123  However, the Court confuses
the issue by citing a treatise edition from 1984 in discussing proximate
cause in the RICO context.124  This discussion illustrates that the
courts have been inattentive to temporal orientation and the chang-
ing nature of proximate cause over time.
Even if courts can agree on whether statutory proximate cause is
defined at the inception of the statute or the time of the decision,
119 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267 (1992).
120 Id. at 268.
121 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
122 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1939).
123 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
124 Id.
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difficult questions exist about whether proximate cause becomes fro-
zen in time in the statutory context or whether it can continue to
evolve in a common law tradition.  Judges also must determine which
of several iterations of proximate cause the legislature intended or
expressed.  These temporal orientation issues are key to understand-
ing what courts mean when they use the term “proximate cause.”
E. Failure to Value Express Liability Limits
Many statutory proximate cause cases involve the same flawed,
cursory reasoning.  The court first looks for a causal term or terms in
the statute and then reasons that this causal term means proximate
cause because the same or similar causal language means proximate
cause in the torts context.  This argument ignores that many statutory
regimes differ from tort causes of action in a fundamental way.
Unlike common law torts, many statutes contain liability limiters not
just in their causal language, but throughout the statutory regime.
Since proximate cause is essentially about limiting liability, courts
must consider these other provisions when determining the appropri-
ate space, if any, for proximate cause to operate within the statutory
regime.
In a torts case, it makes sense to look to the causal language as
the primary source of liability limits, because in many instances, the
tort consists of a limited number of elements.  Consider negligence,
which is often defined with four elements: breach, of a duty, causing,
damages.125  A common law negligence regime does not define the
parties that may face liability or define the scope of conduct that
might lead to liability.  However, many statutes more specifically
define prohibited conduct, the class of protected individuals, or the
identity of potentially liable defendants.  These statutory provisions
speak to limits on liability, the same concern as proximate cause.
An example is helpful in illustrating this point.  The Staub case
discussed above strongly suggests that proximate cause will be applied
in the employment discrimination context.126  Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the cornerstone employment discrimination statute, con-
tains numerous provisions that already address liability limits.  A Title
VII claim may only be pursued by certain statutorily defined plaintiffs
and may only be pursued against certain statutorily defined defend-
125 See Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 2011).
126 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (noting that USERRA is
very similar to Title VII).
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ants.127  Title VII not only defines prohibited discriminatory conduct,
but the statute and subsequent case law define when employers are
allowed to engage in certain conduct that might otherwise be con-
strued as discriminatory.128  It also contains odd burden-shifting fea-
tures that give each party certain responsibilities to prove or disprove
liability.129  The statute also specifically indicates the type of damages
for which defendants will be liable.130  Short deadlines for filing suit
and an administrative exhaustion requirement also make it unlikely
that typical proximate cause factual scenarios will occur in employ-
ment cases.131
These attributes of federal employment discrimination law
represent both explicit and implicit choices about the core concerns
of proximate cause, limiting the courts’ power to make contrary judg-
ments.  Under Title VII, there is a strong argument that the courts
should not apply common law proximate cause because Congress
already addressed many concerns related to proximate cause in
express language.  These interlocking statutory provisions represent
choices made by Congress about the limits of liability.  Given the need
for consensus-building in legislation and the legislature’s ability to
craft more detailed regimes, these choices are often expressed
throughout statutory regimes and through a variety of different mech-
anisms.132  Arguments about proximate cause drawn from general
causal language ignore that the core concern of proximate cause is
limiting liability and that statutes speak to this concern through vari-
ous mechanisms.
Further, if proximate cause is concerned with line drawing, the
courts risk upsetting a complex statutory regime by assuming proxi-
mate cause from general causal language.  At times, a statutory regime
already balances the defendant’s recklessness or intention to harm,
the relative wrongfulness of the parties’ conduct, whether the extent
of liability was out of proportion to the degree of wrongfulness, and
127 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (making it an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to engage in certain types of conduct); Salamon v. Our Lady of Vic-
tory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 228 n.11 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting independent contractors
are not protected by Title VII).
128 See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV.
69 (2011) (arguing that courts have narrowly construed Title VII’s language to restrict
the types of prohibited conduct).
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), (m) (2006).
130 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (providing compensatory and punitive damages for
intentional discrimination claims).
131 See, e.g., Brooks v. Midwest Heart Grp., 655 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2011).
132 See also POPKIN, supra note 3, at 120 (discussing how worker’s compensation R
laws abrogated the common law through various compromises).
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the perceived purpose of the obligations created by the statutory
regime.133  Courts using proximate cause must at least be aware that
common law proximate cause ideas might upset this balance.
Even if a statute does not address all proximate cause concerns,
many at least address more of them than traditional common law
torts, such as negligence.  In these instances, courts must consider
whether the concept of proximate cause in the statute is coterminous
with the common law ideas of that term.
When courts only look to causal language to determine whether
proximate cause is needed, they ignore the complex web of other lim-
iting principles that are often contained in statutes.  In many
instances, these limiting principles will make it clear that Congress has
already spoken to proximate cause concerns, eliminating the need for
the courts to apply the doctrine.  In others, the statutory provisions
may leave a narrow space for proximate cause.  Given the breadth of
potential statutory language, it is also possible that some regimes may
require a broader use of proximate cause, perhaps even broader than
that typically used at common law.
F. Derivative Reasoning Problems
When the Supreme Court adopts proximate cause for one stat-
ute, courts often use this holding to justify applying it to other statu-
tory regimes.  This is highly problematic because courts’ relationship
with statutes may vary depending on a host of factors that are typically
not reconsidered in the subsequent opinion.
Take the following example.  In Associated General Contractors, the
Supreme Court interpreted a remedial provision in the Clayton Act to
incorporate proximate cause.134  In that case, unions alleged that
defendants, in violation of the antitrust laws, coerced third parties
into entering business relationships with non-union firms.135  The
Court traced the remedy provision in the Clayton Act to the Sherman
Act.136  It reasoned: “The repeated references to the common law in
the debates that preceded the enactment of the Sherman Act make it
clear that Congress intended the Act to be construed in light of its
common-law background.”137
133 See Stapleton, supra note 6, at 985–86. R
134 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519 (1983).
135 Id. at 521.
136 Id. at 530.
137 Id. at 531.
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In construing the Sherman Act, the Court also emphasized a par-
ticular problem presented by its language.  Its core substantive provi-
sion is so broad, that the courts have indicated that, “it cannot mean
what it says.”138  And it observed that, “Congress did not intend the
antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that
might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.”139  Further, the
Court cited remedies jurisprudence that indicated that the “general
tendency of the law . . . is not to go beyond the first step.”140  The
Court also indicated that it should not grapple with complex
problems involving indirect victims because the directly injured vic-
tims could be counted on to vindicate the law.141
The Sherman Act was enacted in the late 1800s, at a time when
Congress often enacted statutes against a backdrop of the common
law.142  In interpreting the statute’s language, the Court looked to
treatises issued prior to 1890 and at court opinions decided in the
decades after the statute’s enactment.143  It is not clear whether the
Court is actually applying proximate cause to the statute or using
proximate cause to develop a standing doctrine for antitrust.144
Several features of Associated General Contractors are important.
First, the decision is made about a uniquely vague statute that the
Court indicates derives from a common law background.  Second, the
Court conceives the purposes of antitrust law as not providing a rem-
edy for every injury traced to it.  Third, the Court provides a reason
for limiting liability: that the law does not go beyond the first step.
Fourth, the Court is engaging a statute enacted against a backdrop of
common law and at a time when the expected relationship between
the courts and statutes was different than it is now.  Further, the Court
created a standing/proximate cause doctrine using reasoning specific
to the antitrust context.145
138 Id. at 531 (internal quotations omitted); see also Baxter, supra note 66 (discuss-
ing why the Sherman Act might be more susceptible to common law decision making
techniques).
139 Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 534 (internal quotations omitted).
140 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
141 See id. at 543–44.
142 See id. at 531–533; see also POPKIN, supra note 3, at 61 (noting how legislation R
changed in the late 1800s); id. at 67 (discussing how courts in the 1800s tried to
reconcile the common law with statutes).
143 Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 532, n.24 & 533.
144 See id. at 535 (“There is a similarity between the struggle of common-law judges
to articulate a precise definition of the concept of ‘proximate cause,’ and the struggle
of federal judges to articulate a precise test to determine whether a party injured by
an antitrust violation may recover treble damages.” (footnote omitted)).
145 Id. at 537–538.
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Although this reasoning is important to the Court’s decision, it is
downplayed in later cases that rely on its reasoning but that are not
decided in the Sherman or Clayton Act context.  Indeed, Associated
General Contractors is cited in a cascade of subsequent decisions.  In
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,146 the Court relied on it to
recognize proximate cause ideas in RICO.147  In a subsequent deci-
sion, Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., the Supreme Court relied heavily
on the Holmes decision to deny recovery based on proximate cause
principles under a separate RICO provision.148  Thus, Anza is deriva-
tive of Holmes, which is derivative of Associated General Contractors.  The
Staub Court cited Anza in support of the proposition that proximate
cause can be applied USERRA.149
Whether a particular statutory proximate cause argument is
appropriate varies depending on the statute at issue.150  For example,
applying Sherman Act decisions to other statutes is a problem because
the Sherman Act’s language has been construed to be so broad that it
cannot be enforced as written and its statutory text has been described
as “devoid of content.”151  Some commentators have asserted that
antitrust law is incompatible with textualism.152  Techniques used to
interpret the Sherman Act may not apply to other statutes with more
comprehensive language.
Given the specificity of the arguments needed to construct statu-
tory proximate cause, it is unconvincing when courts import reason-
ing from one statutory regime to another regime, without careful
examination of the similarities and differences between the statutes.
Statutes vary in their specificity and ambiguity with respect to proxi-
mate cause issues.  And statutes also vary with respect to the tools that
might be available for conducting proximate cause analysis.  Further,
each statutory regime may have varying levels of desirable judicial
intrusion.  Unfortunately, courts continue to use derivate reasoning.
146 503 U.S. 258, 259 (1992).
147 Id. at 267–268
148 547 U.S. 451, 456 (2006) (“Our analysis begins—and, as will become evident,
largely ends—with Holmes.”)
149 See Staub v. Procter Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011).  It also cited Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  However, the portions of the Sosa decision per-
taining to proximate cause are dicta and do not directly address when and how proxi-
mate cause is appropriate in the statutory context. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192 (citing
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 704).
150 Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51,
53 (2010) (describing patent law as a “common law enabling statute.”).
151 Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in This Class?” The
Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 620 (2005).
152 See id. at 622.
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To date, the courts have not adequately considered the complex-
ity inherent in statutory proximate cause decisions.  As this Part dem-
onstrates, courts often rely on weak textual, intentionalist and
purposivist arguments to justify proximate cause.  In some instances,
courts appear to use multiple arguments to strengthen the appear-
ance of the argument in favor of proximate cause in a particular case.
However, if each of the weak or incorrect arguments is stripped away,
then it is clear that many statutory proximate cause cases rest on weak
foundations.
Given the malleability of proximate cause, courts should explic-
itly provide the statutory interpretation goals, methodology and tem-
poral orientation applied to each statutory proximate cause issue.
Such explicit reasoning is necessary to determine whether the court is
complying with its constitutional role and for later courts to deter-
mine whether a particular court’s decision is limited to its particular
circumstances.  Notice that this Article does not challenge generally
the ability of courts to apply common law principles to statutory
regimes.  Rather, it argues that proximate cause is so particularly
problematic that courts should, as a matter of prudence, engage in a
more sophisticated analysis before using it.
It is unclear whether courts are ignorant of the weakness of their
arguments, whether they are purposefully engaging in legal fictions to
mask other lawful purposes, or whether they are refusing to engage in
“honest interpretation to hide raw policy-making.”153  While errors or
a lack of candor do not automatically lead to the assumption that the
courts are improperly exercising authority, it does suggest the possibil-
ity.  Further, courts should, at a minimum, be guided by “articulable
legal principles.”154  Given the important interests at stake in the statu-
tory proximate cause context, it is important for courts to provide
honest rationales for their decisions or at least rationales that provide
plausible reasons for using proximate cause.
IV. INTERSECTIONALITY PROBLEMS WITH PROXIMATE
CAUSE AND STATUTES
The prior Part discussed flawed reasoning courts use when con-
sidering statutory proximate cause questions.  This Part demonstrates
why proximate cause is generally a poor fit with statutory regimes.
153 CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 88 (discussing honest interpretation); see Peter J. R
Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L. REV. 1435 (2007).
154 Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485,
519 (2010) (arguing the courts should not apply equitable balancing in statutory
cases).
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This Part discusses the major questions and problems courts must
grapple with before recognizing proximate cause.
At times, it appears the Court assumes that proximate cause prin-
ciples will apply unless there is a clear indication that Congress
intended to dispense with them.155  This assumption is no longer war-
ranted.  Rather, courts should, as a matter of prudence, be extraordi-
narily reluctant to create statutory proximate cause, especially in cases
where there is only weak textual, intentionalist, or purposivist support
for the proposition.  Applying proximate cause to statutes requires
nuanced discussions about the interaction of torts and statutes.  It also
requires courts to examine the space each statute possibly reserves for
statutory proximate cause.  Many liability-limiting problems can often
be addressed by using statutory provisions, by using administrative def-
erence, by highlighting the problem for future legislative or agency
attention, or by using other less troublesome doctrines.  In those rare
instances where proximate cause should be used, this Part describes
problems courts will nonetheless create by using proximate cause.
A. A Tort is Not Always the Right Kind of Tort
When courts consider statutory proximate cause, they must first
consider whether the statutory regime in general and the particular
provision at issue are similar enough to torts that use proximate cause
for borrowing to be appropriate.  In the past, courts have assumed
that statutory proximate cause is appropriate because civil statutes
generally fall under the umbrella of torts156 and that tort doctrines
such as proximate cause can then be applied.  This Part demonstrates
that this fundamental premise does not probe deep enough to be
meaningful.
Tort law can be defined as being “about the wrongs that a private
litigant must establish to entitle her to a court’s assistance in obtaining
a remedy and the remedies that will be made available to her.”157
Many statutory regimes are only torts in the broadest sense of the
term—they are civil actions that do not arise in contract.158  Such a
definition reveals little159 about whether the statutes are similar to
155 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 712
(1995) (holding that “harm” can include habitat modification).
156 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (“[W]hen Congress
creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law.”).
157 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 919.
158 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
159 Max Radin, A Speculative Inquiry into the Nature of Torts, 21 TEX. L. REV. 697,
698–99 (1943) (noting that it is of little value to say that a “tort is something that is
actionable but is neither a contract nor a quasi-contract”).
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common law torts, such as negligence, in any meaningful way.  As dis-
cussed in more detail below, it is in negligence cases that proximate
cause most often applies, “contain[ing] the voraciousness of the negli-
gence principle within tolerable bounds.”160
Negligence concerns a relatively undefined relationship between
the parties, which has no definite boundary for liability.  Negligence
also does not specifically define the type of activity that must occur to
create liability.  Thus, a person might be liable for a wide range of
conduct and harms, as long as the defendant breached a duty of rea-
sonable care.  Further, negligence can exist when there are just slight
deviations from community norms and liability may be out of propor-
tion to the fault, especially in cases where there is no moral fault.161
In this malleable context of undefined relationships and rela-
tively undefined duties, a similarly undefined limiting principle such
as proximate cause makes more sense.  This is especially true given
that judges acting in common law capacities are responsible for the
creation and evolution of non-statutory negligence law.
However, statutory regimes often do not resemble negligence in
important respects.  For example, a statute might define protected
parties, potential defendants, or the relationship that must exist
between parties for liability to attach.162  The statute might prohibit
actions, at least more precisely than the common law concepts of
breach and duty.163  Many statutes calibrate damages with liability,
such that there is some legislative thought behind the proper liability
for a particular violation.164  Some statutes also provide plaintiffs the
ability to prevail on intent-based and non-intent claims.165  Many stat-
utes contain affirmative defenses that allow defendants to escape or
minimize liability in particularly defined instances.166  As discussed in
Part III.E., supra, statutes often contain various liability-limiting princi-
ples throughout their statutory language.  Congress has continued to
160 Stapleton, supra note 6, at 956. R
161 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 282.
162 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (making it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to engage in certain types of conduct); Salamon v. Our Lady
of Victory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 228 n.11 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting independent contrac-
tors are not protected by Title VII).
163 See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006).
164 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006) (providing compensatory and punitive
damages for intentional discrimination claims, but not for disparate impact claims).
165 See Sperino, supra note 128, at 74–81 (discussing frameworks used to evaluate R
discrimination claims).
166 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (describing employer’s affirma-
tive defense in Title VII disparate impact cases).
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amend certain statutes to increase, decrease, or clarify the appropriate
bounds of liability.167
To the extent that a statute has some or all of these traits, it
becomes less like common law negligence, where proximate cause has
its greatest applicability.  Courts that reason that a statute is a tort gen-
erally are not classifying the statute with enough precision.  Rather,
any court considering statutory proximate cause questions must ask
whether the statute they are interpreting is enough like common law
torts that use proximate cause.
This more nuanced reasoning is important because even within
the general realm of torts proximate cause is not used uniformly.
Rather, the doctrine of proximate cause morphs depending on the
context in which it is being applied, with proximate cause hardly ever
being an issue in intentional tort cases.168
As discussed earlier, various reasons exist for this differential
treatment.  First, “the requirement in negligence cases that the plain-
tiff’s harm be an expectable or foreseeable consequence of the defen-
dant’s actions does not apply to intentional torts.”169  Second, courts
express less concern about limiting a defendant’s liability in situations
where the defendant has acted with the requisite intent, which in
many instances means that the defendant is considered to be morally
blameworthy.170  Third, in intentional tort cases, “the defendant’s
wrongful conduct is closely linked—temporally and conceptually—to
the plaintiff’s harm.”171  Fourth, the risks of inefficient over-deter-
rence are lessened in intentional tort cases.172  And, traditional inten-
tional tort cases typically do not involve multiple causes.173
However, courts fail to distinguish between intentional and non-
intentional torts in the statutory proximate cause context.  For exam-
ple, in the Staub case, the Court emphasized that USERRRA requires
intentional action; however, the Court did not discuss whether proxi-
167 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (amending Title VII to clarify
how disparate impact analysis should proceed).
168 See AM. JUR. 2D Negligence, § 422 (2004) (discussing proximate cause and inten-
tional torts); David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1765, 1773 n.30 (1997) (stating that the rule of proximate cause is so broad in inten-
tional torts that it almost has “the full reach of factual causation”).
169 Fisch, supra note 35, at 832. R
170 Id. at 832.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 833.
173 Id. at 832.
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mate cause principles apply differently in this context than they would
in a context of negligent conduct.174
Not only did proximate cause largely develop in the context of
negligence and, to a lesser extent, strict liability, it also largely devel-
oped in response to cases involving physical actions.  Thus, when
courts cite extreme cases in which proximate cause limits liability, the
examples are almost uniformly ones involving multiple physical
actions.  For example, the Supreme Court has indicated that proxi-
mate cause would limit liability under the Endangered Species Act if a
tornado lifted fertilizer from a farmer’s tilled field and deposited the
fertilizer in a wildlife refuge where it injured an endangered spe-
cies.175  When statutes involve primarily economic harm or emotional
injury, courts must determine whether concerns that developed in the
physical harm context carry over to the new type of harm.176
Further, torts such as negligence play a loss-allocating role that is
not shared by many statutes.  For example, it would be difficult to
argue that many civil rights statutes serve a loss-allocation function.
Given these differences, it is not sufficient to determine that a
statute is like a tort in some general sense.  Rather, it is necessary to
ask which traditional tort the statutes most mimic.  The answer to this
question is not uniform across the statutory regimes, and may even
vary within statutory regimes that embrace varying norms of fault.
Further, some statutes vary so dramatically from common law causes
of action that it may be difficult to map them onto any version of
common law liability.177
B. Framing the Space For Proximate Cause
Courts considering statutory proximate cause questions must also
identify the space a particular statute allows for proximate cause and
174 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).  Another feature of
USERRA is important in the proximate cause inquiry.  The statute allows for the
plaintiff to prevail against the employer for the acts of its agents in certain circum-
stances. Id. at 1192.  Thus, questions about whether a defendant should be liable
relate to, among other things, both agency and cause.
175 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713
(1995).
176 For some statutes, it may be even more difficult to characterize the harms.
Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2147 (2007) (noting that discrimination claims
“often articulate a type of injury—disproportionately experienced by members of sub-
ordinated groups—that cannot be pinned down as psychological, economic, or physi-
cal in nature, or as either individual or group based”).
177 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 154, at 529–30 (discussing how environmental R
law differs from common law).
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the version of proximate cause to be applied.  As discussed in detail in
Part I, supra, proximate cause does not have a fixed meaning or goal,
outside of a general principle of limiting liability.  Proximate cause
may be concerned with problems regarding intervening actions, a
foreseeable plaintiff, the scope of risk of the defendant’s actions, or
policy.178  In some instances, proximate cause may be used as a proxy
for other concerns, and in some cases one or more of these rationales
may animate proximate cause.179  This nuance is often cloaked in
court language that renders proximate cause as a unitary concept.
For example, in Staub the Court reasoned that the use of causal factor
language in a statute incorporates “the traditional tort-law concept of
proximate cause.”180
In the statutory context, it is important how courts frame the
goals of proximate cause with respect to a particular statute.  Some or
all of those goals may already be addressed in the statute, leaving little
or no space for the court to fill with common law ideas.  Indeed, stat-
utes often express liability-limiting principles through a broad range
of provisions, in contrast to traditional tort law.  Congress might
express limits by defining the parties who may sue, by using affirma-
tive defenses, by providing limited remedies, by narrowly proscribing
prohibited conduct, or by defining statutory terms.  Having courts
develop a proximate cause analysis without considering these provi-
sions would allow them to intrude upon an interconnected web of
congressional judgments about how and when liability should be
limited.
When determining the space that might exist for proximate
cause, courts must also be mindful of the version of proximate cause
they intend to apply.  A statute may leave little or no space for some
goals.  For example, most of the traditional torts do not define the
relationship that must exist between the plaintiff and the defendant to
create liability.181  Negligence applies in situations involving various
kinds of plaintiffs and defendants.  In general, a person or entity owes
duties to the world.182  This is radically different from many statutes,
178 See supra Part I.
179 See supra Part I.
180 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011).
181 See, e.g., Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 2011)
(describing elements of negligence).
182 At times, either by common law or statutes, certain types of potential defend-
ants are exempted from liability; however, the modern trend is to reduce the available
exemptions. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of Religious Institutions
to Protect Others: Surgical Instruments, Not Machetes, Are Required, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 12
(2005) (discussing how charitable immunity waned in the 20th century).
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which define the appropriate plaintiffs and/or the appropriate
defendants in a narrow fashion.  Thus, if proximate cause is con-
cerned about whether the plaintiff was foreseeable, some statutes
already speak to this concern, either diminishing or eliminating the
space for proximate cause to accomplish this goal.183  However, there
might be greater space for other proximate cause rationales within
the same statutory regime.
Two other examples are helpful in showing why the particular
proximate cause rationale might affect the outcome of statutory analy-
sis.  The reasonable foresight doctrine is premised, in part, on the
idea that it is inefficient to hold defendants liable for the full harm
caused by their negligent activity.184  Some statutory regimes may not
have the same efficiency goals.  If the core concern of proximate
cause is actually duty, many statutes actually speak to this concern
more specifically than common law negligence.  The question in duty
cases is whether the defendant and the plaintiff stand in relation to
one another in a way that creates a legally recognized obligation.185
Many statutes define prohibited conduct more specifically than com-
mon law negligence.
Each statute may have a varying degree of space within which
proximate cause can plausibly operate and this space depends on the
statute’s other liability limits.  In some statutory contexts, court inter-
pretations of the statute in other areas may likewise limit the space for
proximate cause.
Further, if a court uses one rationale to apply proximate cause to
a statutory regime, it does not follow that the court can then use the
same reasoning to read a different rationale into another statute.  In
Associated General Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Calif. State Council of
Carpenters,186 the Court looked to contemporary ideas of proximate
cause in 1890 when the Sherman Act was enacted.187  In doing so, it
cited treatises explaining the meaning of proximate cause.  One trea-
tise stated that “natural, proximate, and legal results are all” that can
be recovered for, and the other indicated that the reason for this rule
is to be “found in the impossibility of tracing consequences through
successive steps to the remote cause, and the necessity of pausing in
183 See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and
Proximate Cause, 2013 ILL. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2013).
184 Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 300 (2002)
(arguing that proximate cause is two doctrines: one focusing on multiple causes and
one focusing on cases with multiple risks).
185 KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 274.
186 459 U.S. 519 (1983)
187 Id. at 532 & n.24.
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the investigation of the chain of events at the point beyond which
experience and observation convince us we cannot press our inquiries
with safety.”188  Subsequent courts cited Associated General Contractors
for the idea that it is appropriate to apply proximate cause to statutes
but then applied a different version of proximate cause.189
In many cases, the courts fail to identify the type of proximate
cause being applied to the regime or even apply different versions of
the doctrine within the same opinion.  This raises several important
questions.  It is questionable whether the majority opinions that rest
on conflicting rationales can actually be classified as majority opinions
in their expression of proximate cause.  In some instances, it is possi-
ble that a particular factual issue credibly implicates multiple, overlap-
ping goals of proximate cause.  However, in other instances, judges
may actually disagree about the type of proximate cause to be applied.
In these latter instances, subsequent courts will be left with little gui-
dance, other than a general idea that proximate cause can be applied
to the statute.
Further, if courts are not identifying the goals of proximate cause
related to a particular statutory regime, the term “proximate cause”
may serve as nothing more than an empty vessel into which courts can
apply any meaning they see fit, whether the meaning comports with
the underlying statute or not.
In defining the available space for proximate cause, courts must
also articulate the constitutional space in which they are operating.
The space for proximate cause might change depending on what rea-
son is given.  For example, if the problem before the court is one that
Congress never anticipated, the courts may have greater leeway to
handle the unanticipated case.  When courts do not clearly express
why they are recognizing proximate cause, they risk using it in cases
where liability limits are clearly contained within a statute’s language,
intent, or purpose.  Requiring courts to define the available space for
proximate cause is important in its own right in that it will help future
litigants and those affected by the statutes to determine whether and
188 Id. (quoting respectively J. LAWSON, RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND PRACTICE 1740
(1890) and T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 73 (2d ed. 1888)). The Court also relies on a
treatise discussing problems regarding remoteness; however, this refers to concerns
about the certainty of damages. Id. at 532 n.25.
189 See, e.g., Service Emps. Int’l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing how the district court used
the proximate cause standard from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) to
evaluate proximate cause); Quade v. Rodriguez, No. 2:07-CV-64, 2009 WL 2170146, at
*7–8 (E.D. Tenn. July 21, 2009).
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how proximate cause is likely to be used in respect to a specific
statute.
C. Proximate Cause Is Evolving
Courts also must consider how proximate cause’s changing
nature affects statutory interpretation.  Thus courts must consider
how statutes interact with the common law, whether applying proxi-
mate cause freezes that doctrine in the statute, and how courts as an
institution interact with statutes over time.
Proximate cause is an evolving common law doctrine.190  Several
of the underlying rationales of proximate cause are considered to be
outdated.191  As discussed in section III.D, this feature of proximate
cause should raise important statutory interpretation questions
regarding temporal orientation, but, to date, the courts have largely
ignored these issues.192
These problems can be illustrated by the Supreme Court’s use of
Sherman Act proximate cause to import the concept into a RICO pro-
vision.193  Congress enacted the Sherman Act in the late 1800s, and
RICO in 1970.194  During the interim between the two Acts, several
important legal developments occurred regarding proximate cause:
the Palsgraf case and the Restatement (First) of Torts.195  Importantly, by
1970, many early iterations of proximate cause had been largely
rejected.  It is highly debatable that in 1970 Congress both under-
stood that the Sherman Act used proximate cause and that it under-
stood which version of proximate cause the courts used in the early
1900s.  This argument is less compelling given that the concept of
proximate cause was undergoing rapid development in the twentieth
century.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[w]e may
fairly credit . . . Congress, which enacted RICO, with knowing the
interpretation federal courts had given the words earlier Congresses
had used . . . .”196  Further confusion is invited because modern itera-
190 See supra Part I.
191 See supra Part I.
192 See supra Part III.D.
193 See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 (1992) (stating that it
is very unlikely that “Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover”
and thus RICO should not be read expansively); id. at 259.
194 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–7 (2006)); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006)).
195 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF TORTS (1939).
196 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
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tions of proximate cause separate the concept from factual cause,
while earlier versions of legal cause encompassed both inquiries.197
Whenever courts apply common law concepts to statutes they nat-
urally implicate large questions about the proper interplay of statutes,
the common law, and the courts.  How these questions are resolved
also depends on how judges view their constitutional role and the
appropriate methods for complying with it.  Statutory proximate cause
cases present interesting dilemmas for judges.
Consider a judge who believes that the court’s function is to inter-
pret statutes using textualist tools and that the meaning of the statute
is fixed at the time of the legislation’s passage.  If that judge uses some
of the weak textual analysis described earlier, the judge can reason
that it is proper to recognize proximate cause with respect to a statute.
If the judge is being consistent with his or her statutory interpretation
philosophy, the judge will be required to determine the meaning of
proximate cause at the time the legislature enacted the statute.  For
statutes enacted long ago, this version of proximate cause is likely to
be different than modern iterations.  For example, the Staub decision
refers to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which has already been
updated.198  Indeed, any fixed version of proximate cause is likely to
become out of sync with the evolving common law.
Judges who believe that common law statutory concepts can
evolve with the underlying common law face a different set of chal-
lenges.  They will be tasked with determining when the statutory con-
cept becomes so divorced from the common law that the statutory
concept must be adapted.  This includes the possibility that the con-
cept of proximate cause might be significantly diminished or abol-
ished over time.
Closely related to this temporal orientation question is the ques-
tion of whether courts should view statutes as independent islands of
obligation or whether they should integrate statutes within the
broader legal landscape.199  Courts might also be concerned about
how the body of law in a particular area develops.
197 See Stapleton, supra note 6, at 957 (stating that sometimes proximate cause is R
used to mean legal cause as articulated in early Restatements but sometimes it is used in
a more limited way).
198 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 435, 435B, cmt. a (1965)).
199 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991) (articulating that
the court should interpret ambiguous terms in light of recent and past legislation as it
is the court’s role “to make sense . . . out of the corpus juris”).  This inquiry also over-
laps with statutory interpretation methodologies. See POPKIN, supra note 3, at 157 R
(“[One strand of textualism] rests on a normative conception . . . that [assumes] legis-
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Notice that these different viewpoints about temporal orientation
make it difficult for a court composed of judges with these differing
viewpoints to reach agreement on anything other than the broad prin-
ciple that proximate cause should be used with respect to a particular
regime.  Thus, it is not surprising that statutory proximate cause opin-
ions often contain a hodge-podge of selected quotes, rather than a
detailed analysis of proximate cause.200  Because courts use the term
“proximate cause” to describe an array of goals and motivations, it is
also likely that when subsequent courts rely on a prior statutory proxi-
mate cause case, they may not intend the same doctrine as that used
by an earlier court.
Further, the very nature of the relationship between the common
law, statutes, and the courts is evolving.201  Guido Calabresi notes that
early statutes were often written in broad operative language that lent
itself to common law-like interpretive techniques.202  It is an interest-
ing question whether modern judges approaching a statutory proxi-
mate cause question with regard to an old statute must also place
themselves in the same posture with respect to the statute that the
enacting Congress would have expected them to take, if such a pos-
ture is even discoverable.203  This question is especially complex for
statutes that have been repeatedly amended over time.  To date,
courts have not addressed any of these issues in statutory proximate
cause cases.
D. Proximate Cause is Not Theoretically Stable.
Proximate cause is not theoretically stable.  This feature causes
two problems in the statutory proximate cause context.  First, courts
interpreting federal statutes will have the same problems state courts
have had in defining proximate cause.  Second, this indeterminacy
lation is a radically separate source of law, not part of a broader legal fabric that the
judge has a responsibility to develop.”).
200 POPKIN, supra note 3, at 157. R
201 For further discussion of this idea see CALABRESI, supra note 3; Pound, supra R
note 3. R
202 CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 5. R
203 See generally Brian G. Slocum, Overlooked Temporal Issues in Statutory Interpretation,
81 TEMP L. REV. 635 (2008) (considering whether new or modified rules of interpreta-
tion should be applied only prospectively or also retrospectively); see also POPKIN,
supra note 3, at 38 (arguing that it is difficult to understand how earlier generations R
of judges would have viewed the appropriate function of statutory interpretation); id.
at 45 (noting that in the late 1700s, the line between statutes and common law was not
clearly delineated); id. at 61 (noting how legislation changed in the late 1800s); id. at
67–68 (discussing how courts in the 1800s tried to reconcile the common law with
statutes).
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means that courts are making relatively unguided choices among con-
flicting policies.
In defining the key attributes of proximate cause, the federal
courts will have the same problems that state courts have had.
Harkening back to first-year torts, many lawyers can remember the
confused mash of cases selected to demonstrate the proximate cause
inquiry.  These cases are known for their contradictory language and
inability to articulate a common rationale for proximate cause.204
There is simply no fixed proximate cause analysis.  As one court
noted:
Although many legal scholars have attempted to lay down a single
standard to determine proximate causation, . . . no satisfactory uni-
versal formula has emerged.  Instead, proximate cause is always to
be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent.205
The sheer number of considerations and possibilities for each
statutory regime makes it likely that courts will apply proximate cause
idiosyncratically.  At its core, proximate cause “is practical politics.”206
Proximate cause also is highly indefinite.
Given that there is no agreed upon source for the common law,
courts applying common law doctrines are always making important
choices about where common law is best expressed.  When using
proximate cause in statutes, it is unclear whether courts are simply
borrowing common law definitions, whether they are creating a fed-
eral common law for federal statutes generally or for the particular
statute in question,207 or whether they are simply investing their own
ideas into the empty vessel of proximate cause.  More importantly,
courts have not considered which of the options is preferred as a nor-
mative matter.
Each choice poses interesting problems.  If the court believes it is
creating a special definition of proximate cause for a particular fed-
204 CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (2011) (noting that com-
mon law proximate cause “formulations varied, and were often both constricted and
difficult to comprehend”).
205 John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 586 S.E.2d 26, 29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
206 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
207 For a discussion regarding courts’ power to create federal common law, see
Goldstein, supra note 154, at 519.  When courts apply common law principles to statu- R
tory regimes, those principles are often applied differently. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY, Introduction (2006) (discussing how courts import common law princi-
ples into statutory analysis but vary the underlying principles given the particular stat-
utory regime).
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eral statute, the court-created doctrine would vary by statute.  It also
would likely take into account other core policy concerns of the stat-
ute, such as whether the statute is a liberal one, what ideas it expresses
about victim compensation, the likelihood of overdeterrence, and
whether, without proximate cause, liability will be out of proportion to
the degree of wrongfulness of the defendant’s actions.
Even if one believes that courts have the power to create federal
common law, the choice to create a specific proximate cause standard
for each statute means that the statute’s version of proximate cause is
likely to be out of line with other articulations of proximate cause.
This raises important issues about whether common law doctrines
should remain consistent across statutory regimes or whether it is
more appropriate to develop specific versions of proximate cause for
each statute.  It also creates questions about what should occur when
the statute is amended or when court doctrines related to the statute
change in ways that would alter the proximate cause question.
V. A STATUTORY PROXIMATE CAUSE ARCHITECTURE
This Part develops an architecture to guide courts regarding
whether proximate cause should be used in statutes.  Given the diffi-
cult theoretical, doctrinal and practical problems raised, the architec-
ture is premised on a strong reluctance to use proximate cause.  Such
reluctance is necessary because statutory proximate cause necessarily
implicates difficult questions about separation of powers and the rela-
tionship between statutes and the common law that the courts have to
date been unable or unwilling to honestly resolve.  Further, given its
evolving nature and indeterminacy, proximate cause is especially sus-
ceptible to disingenuous interpretation. Given these problems and
the courts’ collective refusal to resolve them in any meaningful way, it
is reasonable to urge extreme caution in this area.
It is first necessary to diminish any claims that proximate cause is
needed to prevent statutes from spiraling into absurdity.  Despite its
imprecision, it might be argued that proximate cause is still useful or
that it is the best solution to a difficult problem.208  Indeed, the
Supreme Court Justices are masters at positing parades of horribles to
conjure the need for proximate cause.  For example, the Justices have
indicated that proximate cause is needed in the environmental con-
text to prohibit a farmer from being liable when a tornado picks up
208 CSX Transp., 131 S. Ct. at 2645 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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fertilizer from his property and deposits it far away, killing endan-
gered animals.209
These examples are often straw-men arguments as they do not
correlate either with the case before the Court or the types of cases
being considered by the courts.  If courts risk upsetting separation of
powers and other important concerns, they must first examine
whether the need for proximate cause is real and substantial.
However, even in cases where it might seem tempting to use
proximate cause, the courts often jump to it without considering
other possibilities.  Consider statutes in Categories C and D that con-
tain numerous provisions that address liability limits.  For these stat-
utes, questions about the appropriate limits of liability may actually
exist within the statute itself.  Given courts’ fixation on weak textual
claims related to general causal language, they have often failed to
consider whether the statute’s language itself already addresses the
question of whether liability should be limited.  For example, if a stat-
ute specifically defines the parties who can claims its benefits, the par-
ties who are subject to liability, and the prohibited actions, it is
questionable whether proximate cause is even needed.  At a mini-
mum, courts considering proximate cause must explore whether the
statute speaks to the common law doctrine’s underlying goals.
Case law suggests that courts are often using proximate cause to
avoid other issues.  For example, in the Staub decision, the Supreme
Court fails to draw a clear line between factual cause, proximate
cause, and agency principles.210  In some instances courts are using
proximate cause because they are unwilling to resolve questions relat-
ing to damages, standing, or factual cause.211  The thread of proxi-
mate cause analysis that plays strongest in the RICO context is the
idea of proof problems that would occur in its absence.  Notably, these
proof concerns relate to problems in the plaintiff’s ability to prove
factual causation.212  Further, the Court noted that in RICO cases, the
defendant’s conduct can be deterred because directly injured victims
209 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713
(1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also CSX Transp., 131 S. Ct. at 2651 (positing
that a person might be liable if he drops a piano, it cracks the sidewalk, and weeks
later a person riding a bicycle down the street is injured after driving into cones the
workmen have placed around the site to repair the sidewalk).
210 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191–93 (2011).
211 Notice that this Part is not advocating turning questions of proximate cause
into duty questions.  Rather, courts should carefully consider whether they are dis-
guising duty questions in the language of proximate cause to justify importing the
latter concept. See Stapleton, supra note 6, at 954–55. R
212 See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 273 (1992).
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have incentives to prosecute such claims.213  Given the inherent
problems with proximate cause, it is reasonable to require courts to at
least consider other possible avenues to resolve the issue before resort-
ing to proximate cause.214
Some of these alternative methods provide an additional benefit
in that they more clearly signal to Congress when liability will and will
not attach.215  Therefore, they provide a clearer issue for Congress to
consider regarding whether to overrule a court’s decision.  In theory,
proximate cause is an issue for a jury,216 and it may be difficult for
Congress to determine how interpreting a statute as containing proxi-
mate cause actually affects litigants.
It is often preferable to limit liability through these other mecha-
nisms because they provide the parties with more certainty than proxi-
mate cause would.  In many instances, proximate cause is confusing
and indeterminate, and whether it exists depends on a determination
by a jury.217  However, limiting liability by defining the appropriate
parties, defining the type of harm that must occur, and using factual
cause, provides the parties with the ability to determine whether con-
duct is prohibited prior to trial.  Further, it is unlikely that a particular
jury would be able to fully appreciate the policy concerns that would
be at issue.218  There is evidence that juries often do not understand
proximate cause jury instructions.219
The first step in a statutory proximate cause architecture is for
the court to make a real inquiry into whether proximate cause is actu-
213 Id. at 269–70.
214 There may be limited instances when the court is facing dual concerns, but
proximate cause provides the less entangled avenue.  This Article does not argue that
proximate cause may never be applied to statutes, but rather, that it should be applied
sparingly.
215 See Stapleton, supra note 6, at 953 (reasoning that characterizing the issue as a R
duty issue sends a “powerful systemic message”).  One might argue that Congress
implicitly approves of statutory proximate cause because it has failed to enact new
legislation in response to proximate cause.  The lack of a congressional override is a
weak argument in support of legitimacy given the real costs and likelihood of legisla-
tive reform.  Further, some of the statutory proximate cause cases are fairly recent and
their full consequences may not be fully realized until courts apply the doctrine in
individual cases.
216 KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, § 45, at 320–21.
217 See Stapleton, supra note 6, at 954–55. R
218 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 cmt. f (2010).
219 The inconsistent theoretical foundations of proximate cause and its changing
nature make it difficult to define for juries.  Jurors often misunderstand proximate
cause instructions. Walter W. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent
Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 88–95 (1988).
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ally needed in the first place.  In constitutional cases, there is a canon
of construction that directs courts to avoid constitutional questions
when possible.220  This Article suggests a similar stance for proximate
cause and statutes.
Next, a court must determine whether there is an honest inter-
pretive analysis that calls for proximate cause.  Given the stakes, it is
reasonable to ask courts to refrain from using demonstrably incorrect
legal fictions.  For many modern statutes, general causal language can-
not be read as strong congressional support for proximate cause, espe-
cially for those statutes that strongly contradict the common law.  For
many modern statutes, courts also will need to strongly consider
whether it is fair to assume Congress legislated against the backdrop
of the common law.221
In this step it is also important for courts to evaluate whether the
underlying statute in general and the provision at issue specifically are
like common law negligence or strict liability, such that it would even
be appropriate to draw from proximate cause principles.  For statutes
involving intentional acts, like those in Category B, there is a strong
argument that proximate cause either plays no role or a deeply dimin-
ished role.  For statutes like those in Category D, where the statute is
not enacted against the backdrop of the common law, the courts must
determine why it is nonetheless appropriate to import it.
The third step requires courts to determine the space left for
proximate cause in the particular regime.  To do so, the court must
identify the specific goal or goals of proximate cause that the court
intends to apply.  Even if it is appropriate to use proximate cause in a
statute, statutory proximate cause may not be coterminous with com-
mon law proximate cause.  In certain instances, the statute may
already speak to certain proximate cause goals, leaving no room for
proximate cause to operate.
Further, courts must consider whether it is appropriate to look to
the common law to fill gaps about liability limits.  In other words, even
if the courts find that a statute needs a device like proximate cause,
there may be no reason for courts to use the common law to create
that device.  For certain statutory regimes, it makes more sense to
develop a limit on liability that comports with the underlying statutory
220 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664–65, 2672 (2009) (deciding
statutory question first and declining to reach constitutional issue).
221 A counter-argument may be that Congress knows that courts assume Congress
legislates against the backdrop of the common law and should take this into account
when issuing legislation.  Given the enormity and complexity of the common law, it is
difficult to imagine how Congress could take all of its implications into account when
legislating.
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regime.  This version of proximate cause may not be coterminous with
common law ideas.
Identifying the particular goals of proximate cause serves several
other functions.  First, it diminishes courts’ ability to use proximate
cause as an empty vessel, into which they can pour amorphous ideas.
Second, it provides better guidance for subsequent courts regarding
the specific meaning of proximate cause.  In conducting this third
step, courts should refrain from language that suggests proximate
cause is a unified concept and should also recognize the hazards of
derivative reasoning.
Even if the court is able to credibly claim that proximate cause is
necessary, it must recognize that difficult issues still remain.  The most
challenging is to consider the appropriate temporal frame through
which to view proximate cause, at the time of the statute’s enactment
or through a modern lens.  Courts will also need to consider whether
the goal of statutory proximate cause is to unify proximate cause law
generally or to create a specific proximate cause for each statute.  It
may also need to define the appropriate sources for proximate cause.
Importantly, courts should not rotely apply vague notions of proxi-
mate cause broadly across textually different statutes.
Of course, legislators could also help to resolve the proximate
cause dilemma.  When creating statutes, they could use and define
causal terms to make it clear whether proximate cause should be used.
However, given the number of statutes already created, courts are still
likely to face unresolved statutory proximate cause questions, even if
legislators consider proximate cause questions in future statutes.222
CONCLUSION
This Article creates an architecture through which courts can
engage statutory proximate cause questions more deeply and with
greater care.  To date, courts have approached this task casually and
without recognizing that statutory proximate cause raises important
concerns related to separation of powers and the interaction of the
common law with statutes.  In many instances, they have relied on
weak interpretive claims or outdated assumptions to justify proximate
cause.  As we become farther removed from the common law’s apo-
gee, the courts must become more attuned to whether certain com-
mon law doctrines create special problems when used in statutes,
especially evolving, amorphous doctrines like proximate cause.
222 It is also possible that Congress could enact a statute that gives direction about
causal language generally or for a specific set of statutes.
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